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INTRODUCTION1 
As part of an ordered society governed by the rule of law, American jurisprudence has 
established clearly-defined procedures by which persons may have their disputes peacefully 
resolved. The core precepts of our judicial system require that a person be notified that 
another asserts a claim seeking to hold her liable and an opportunity to be heard, present 
evidence, and raise defenses to that claim. Our justice system requires that only after these 
opportunities have been duly afforded and, where facts are disputed, the claimant's evidence 
has been subjected to the crucible of trial and the claimant has met his burden of proof before 
an impartial fact fmder, will a court impose a judgment in personam against that person. 
B YU has sought, at virtually every level of this case, to defy these settled requirements of our 
justice system. B YU's Brief continues this pattern by seeking to defend the unconstitutional 
July 10, 2002 Order with obfuscation and arguments contrary to governing law. 
First, virtually all of B YU's Brief rests upon a false and unsupported supposition: that 
in this appeal this Court reviews only the denial by Judge Stott of post-judgment motions to 
vacate the July 10, 2002 Order, not the entry of the Order by Judge Howard. BYU ignores 
that when post-judgment motions regarding an order are denied, the original order is not 
reopened or replaced with a new order. Rather the denial restores the finality of the 
underlying order as originally entered. Consequently on an appeal after such a denial, the 
appellate court reviews whether the district court erred in entering the order in the first place 
*Unless otherwise noted, abbreviated terms herein are as defined in the opening Brief of 
Appellant Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc. The Brief of Appellee BYU is referred to herein as 
"Appellee's Br." or "BYU's Br." 
1 
- not whether it was error to deny the post-judgment motions to vacate it. When the 
underlying order, like the July 10,2002 Order, was entered pursuant to a summary judgment 
motion, the appellate court reviews its entry for correctness, must accept all inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party, and must base the review only upon the materials before the 
district court when the Order was entered. Moreover, because the July 10, 2002 Order 
expressly recites that it was entered pursuant to B YIT s summary judgment motion, the Order 
does not contain findings of fact and there is no marshaling requirement for appellants. 
Second, BYU's arguments that due process was satisfied defy settled constitutional 
jurisprudence. As the United States Supreme Court has expressly held, Judge Stott providing 
a hearing on and then denying the motions to vacate the July 10, 2002 Order does not cure 
the due process violations when the Order was first entered. Further, BYU's marshaling 
argument regarding due process has no application in this case. The requirement does not 
apply to the legal conclusion of whether due process was violated, but rather only applies 
when the district court makes subsidiary factual findings that are determinative of that 
conclusion. Here, the determinative facts are undisputed, a matter of record, and show 
Duncan, et al. were never named, served, or provided an opportunity to be heard in the 
underlying arbitration or before the July 10,2002 Order was granted and there was no finding 
of fact to the contrary. Accordingly, there can be no marshaling requirement. 
Otherwise, BYU's Brief in this case actually underscores that the July 10,2002 Order 
was entered in error and that the legal theories therein were rejected by this Court's opinion 
in BYUv.Tremco. B YU virtually ignores the three substantive grounds actually relied upon 
2 
in the July 10,2002 Order to extend liability for the 1998 Judgment to the shareholders and 
officers of Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc.: (1) liability under Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d) as 
members of the fictional "unincorporated association"; (2) liability under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-1408, because the sale of S.T.C.'s stock should simply be equated with a transfer 
of S.T.C.'s assets; and (3) liability for carrying on a corporation's business after its 
dissolution, even though the only conduct on behalf of the dissolved entity (the defense of 
claims) is explicitly authorized by the Utah Code. By ignoring the theories actually relied 
upon in the July 10, 2002 Order, BYU concedes entry of the Order was in error. 
Instead, BYU asserts a new argument under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408, 
regarding the sale of S.T.C.'s stock. BYU's new argument, however, cannot be a basis to 
affirm the July 10,2002 Order. The argument was not an alternative actually made below 
to obtain the Order, is not supported by evidence submitted below, and impermissibly relies 
on disputed inferences favorable to a summary judgment movant. Moreover, the premise of 
BYU's argument - that SoftSolutions, Inc. continued to own the S.T.C. stock after the 1990 
Agreement was entered and until it was sold - is false. Although it now appears 
SoftSolutions, Inc. was the shareholder of S.T.C. on its original formation, it stopped being 
such a shareholder by April 10,1990, was before any time relevant to BYU's new argument. 
I. TREMCO AND SOFTSOLUTIONS. INC. ARE ENTITLED ON THIS APPEAL 
TO OBTAIN REVIEW OF THE ENTRY OF THE JULY 10.2002 ORDER BY 
JUDGE HOWARD. NOT JUDGE STOTT'S DENIAL OF THE RULE 59 
MOTIONS TO VACATE IT. AND THE FILING OF RULE 59 MOTIONS 
DOES NOT DESTROY THIS RIGHT. 
BYU's entire Brief rests upon a false supposition. BYU asserts that Judge Stott's 
3 
denial of the motions to vacate the July 10,2002 Order "is the controlling order for purposes 
of appeal/5 (BYU's Br. at 34.) Without a single supporting authority, BYU is improperly 
trying to convert an appeal as of right concerning the correctness of Judge Howard entering 
the July 10, 2002 Order into one of Judge Stott denying the Motions to Vacate. The 
instant appeal is from entry of the Order, not from the refusal to vacate it. BYU's arguments 
premised upon that false supposition fail, including its reliance on an inapplicable standard 
of review, on materials not part of the record when the Order was entered, and its argument 
that an appellant must marshal the evidence supporting a summary judgment order. 
A. Denial of the Post-judgment Motions Restored the Finality of the July 10. 
2002 Order as Originally Entered and this Appeal Brings the Merits of 
That Order for Review, 
BYU fails to comprehend the actual impact of post-judgment motions. When such 
motions - other than Rule 60(b) motions - are filed, the finality of the underlying order or 
judgment is suspended, precluding appellate review. See, e.g., BYU v. Tremco, 2005 UT 
19, f47.2 If and when those motions are denied, the finality of the original order is 
restored and an appeal properly lies from entry of the original order. As Moore's explains, 
"A timely motion to alter or amend a judgment suspends the finality of the judgment. If the 
2It is now law of the case that the motions to vacate the July 10, 2002 Order were not made 
pursuant to Rule 60(b). In BYU v. Tremco, Tremco argued that the motions to vacate, 
should be viewed as being made under Rule 60(b), which would not have deprived the July 
10, 2002 Order of the finality necessary for this Court to review it. (Tremco5 s Reply Br. at 
21 (Case No. 20020540).) See Utah R. App. P. 4(b). BYU argued that the motions were 
post-judgment motions under Rule 59. (Appellee's Brief (Case No. 20020540) at 38-40.) 
Because this Court held the motions deprived the July 10,2002 Order of finality, precluding 
appellate jurisdiction, BYU v. Tremco, 2005 UT 19, ^ [47, it necessarily ruled the motions 
were Rule 59 motions. That holding is now law of the case. Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 
22,121, 112P.3d495. 
4 
motion is denied, the underlying judgment is final and appealable: thus, appeal more properly 
lies from the judgment than from the order denying relief under Rule 59(e)." James Wm. 
Moore, et al, Moore's Federal Practice § 59.53[1] (3d ed. 2005) (emphasis added). Only if 
the motions are granted, not denied, is the original order "reopened," in which case appellate 
review of the original order is precluded because that order is replaced with a new one. Id 
§ 59.52[1]. In this case, Judge Stott denied the motions to vacate the July 10, 2002 Order. 
This Court already recognized that this appeal following denial of the motions to 
vacate the July 10,2002 Order will bring the merits of that Order for appellate review. BYU 
v. Tremco, 2005 UT 19, ^ 27 & n.8. Moreover, Utah appellate courts routinely review the 
underlying judgments or orders when an appeal is brought after post-judgment motions are 
denied. In so doing, this Court applies the standard of review applicable to the underlying 
order, not the more deferential standard for reviewing denial of the post-judgment motions.3 
For example, in Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, summary judgment was entered 
in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a "motion for reconsideration" which the 
Court viewed as being made under Rule 59, tolling the time for appeal, and which was 
denied. 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-65 (Utah 1991). Notwithstanding the Rule 59 motion, the 
3This is in accord with application of the federal rules. See Foman v. Davis. 371 U.S. 178, 
181 (1962) (holding second notice of appeal filed after denial of Rule 59 motion brought 
original judgment for review); Tango Music v. Deadquick Music. 348 F.3d 244,247 (7th Cir. 
2003) (appeal from denial of motion under "Rule 59(e) brings up the underlying judgment 
for review,... whereas an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion merely brings up 
the order denying the motion"); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.. 98 F.3d 1440, 1445 (3rd 
Cir. 1996); Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.. 96 F.3d 813, 819 (6th Cir. 1996) (on appeal after 
denial of Rule 59 motion, court reviews "grant of summary judgment, employing a de novo 
standard of review" and "does not review the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion separately"). 
5 
Watkiss court addressed the merits of the original grant of summary judgment based upon 
the materials then before the district court, held there was a genuine issue of material fact, 
and reversed the grant of summary judgment. Id at 1066. Likewise, in L & A DrywalL Inc. 
v. Whitmore Constr. Co.. although a motion to alter and amend a grant of summary judgment 
was denied by the district court, this Court reviewed the merits of the underlying summary 
judgment under a correctness standard of review. 608 P.2d 626,628 (Utah 1980). Similarly, 
in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
denial of a motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment but then "turn[ed] to examine 
whether the court correctly granted summary judgment in the first instance" and reversed 
the grant of summary judgment. 761 P.2d 42, 45, 47-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).4 
This Court should reject B YU' s attempts to defeat Tremco' s and SoftSolutions, Inc.' s 
right to obtain appellate review from entry of the July 10, 2002 Order, with this Court 
applying the appropriate "correctness" standard of review to an order rendered pursuant to 
a summary judgment motion, as contravening the sprit of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
44to secure the j u s t . . .determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added); 
cf Hoinessv.U.S.. 335 U.S. 297, 302 (1948) ("It seems to us hypertechnical to say that the 
appeal papers did not bring the sole issue of the case fairly before the Court of Appeals."). 
B. Contrary to BYU's Assertions. Judge Stott Did Not Provide a "Full 
Rehearing" of the Merits of the July 10, 2002 Order When Hearing the 
Motions to Vacate That Order and There Were No Evidentiary Hearings. 
4See also Rosas v. Evre. 2003 UT App 414, [^10, 115, 11119-27, 82 P.3d 185; Estate of 
Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Interstate Land Corp. v. 
Patterson. 797 P.2d 1101, 1104, 1106-07 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
6 
The Court should reject B YU's repeated attempts to mischaracterize the July 22,2003 
oral argument on the motions to vacate as a "full rehearing" on the merits of the July 10, 
2002 Order, (e^g, BYU's Br. at 32-33, 43; 59), which, in turn, would justify a deferential 
standard of review, as well as repeated references to "evidentiary hearings." 
The hearing held July 22, 2003 was an oral argument on the written motions filed 
the year before. (R. 4395 {Notice of Oral Arguments, enclosed in the Addendum hereto as 
Exh. 1.) No witness was sworn or testified during that argument Judge Stott made it 
abundantly clear in denying the motions that he was deferring to Judge Howard's prior Order 
and, because he viewed it as having some support, would permit the July 10,2002 Order to 
"remain the law of the case."5 Labeling the oral argument as a "full rehearing" defies the 
reality of what transpired. 
Likewise, BYU falsely asserts that there were "evidentiary hearings" preceding the 
July 22, 2003 oral argument. (E.g.. Appellees' Br. at 35, 36, 43, 48 n.3.) The supposed 
"evidentiary hearings" were actually the supplemental examinations of Kenneth Duncan and 
Alvin Tedjamulia that Messrs. Duncan and Tedjamulia were required to attend when BYU 
obtained the lifting of the April 29, 2003 stay through ex parte communications. (See 
Tremco's Opening Br. at 26-29,42-46.) The examinations occurred out of court and outside 
the presence of any Judge. Transcripts of the examinations were certainly not before Judge 
5
 (R. 8580 (Tr. 7/22/2003) at 80 ("I believe that Judge Howard's ruling and the observations 
he made in that ruling with respect to the support of his findings are proper and will remain 
the law of the case."); kL at 83 ("I believe that Judge Howard's language in his order, that 
has been read into the record here and referred to by both sides, is appropriate and it will 
remain.") (emphasis added).) 
7 
Howard when he ruled the year before upon BYU's summary judgment motion against 
Tremco and entered the July 10, 2002 Order and, indeed, were not even filed in the district 
court until August 25, 2003 - after Judge Stott ruled from the bench, denying the various 
motions on July 22, 2003. (R. 4934-36.) Equating such out-of-court examinations with 
"evidentiary hearings" is, at best, dishonest. 
C. Whether Entry of the July 10, 2002 Order Was in Error Must Be 
Determined by the Materials Before Judge Howard and the Court Should 
Disregard BYU's Brief Relying Upon Materials Submitted Thereafter. 
In reviewing the entry by Judge Howard of the July 10,2002 Order, the Court should 
disregard all parts of BYU's brief and its accompanying Addendum that rely upon materials 
that were not before Judge Howard. This Court has repeatedly stated that "[u]nder simple 
principles of appellate review, [the Utah Supreme Court] cannot consider matters not in the 
record before the trial court." Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters. 
Inc., 14 Utah 2d 169, 170, 380 P.2d 135, 135 (1963).6 Tabs K, M, N, O, and X in BYU's 
Addendum improperly attempt to put evidence before this Court that was not before Judge 
Howard and, with the exception of Tab K, was not even on file with the district court until 
after Judge Stott, on July 22, 2002, orally denied the motions to vacate. 
In addition, the purported "Amended and Supplemental Complaint" in Tab S of 
6See also Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist. 2002 UT 130, ^51, 63 P.3d 705 (refusing to 
consider on appeal evidence not before the trial court as not part of the record on appeal); 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.. 14 Utah 2d 334, 335, 384 P.2d 109, 109 (1963) (refusing to 
consider on appeal deposition transcripts not actually viewed by trial court); English v. 
Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154,1156 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (presuming depositions filed after the 
date of summary judgment were not considered below and, therefore, could not be 
considered on appeal). 
8 
BYlPs Addendum was never actually before the district court. Tab S represents BYU's 
improper attempt in June 2004 to amend the January 2000 Complaint against Tremco while 
the BYU v. Tremco case was still under advisement with this Court. As Judge Stott later 
affirmed, BYU was not granted leave to file the "Amended and Supplemental Complaint," 
and it is, therefore a nullity.7 Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^ 9, 66 P.3d 592 ("Amended 
complaints that are filed without leave of the court are without legal effect...."). 
D. Because the July 10. 2002 Order Is Expressly Premised on BYU's 
Summary Judgment Motion, There Is No Requirement to Marshal 
Evidence Supporting the Factual Recitations Therein, 
BYU incorrectly asserts there is a duty to marshal evidence supporting factual 
recitations in the July 10,2002 Order to show that the substantive basis for extending liability 
to non-parties was in error. (B YtTs Br. at 27-28,30-32,43-59.) As this Court has expressly 
held, there is no duty to marshal evidence supporting a summary judgment order. 
When appealing a district courts grant of summary judgment, . . . the 
appellant has no obligation to marshal the evidence. The marshaling 
obligation only arises after a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support a jury's verdict or a district court's ruling containing specific 
findings of fact. 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc.. 2003 UT 23, f 16 n.6,70 P.3d 904 (emphasis 
added). This is true even when the district court mislabels8 a summary judgment order as 
7Tr. 9/21/2004 at 41 ("THE JUDGE:... I have no intention now nor did I at the t ime.. . we 
initially discussed this, these issues here[,] to allow amending of a complaint with respect to 
Tremco.") (cited excerpts are in the Addendum hereto as Exh. 2.); id at 44-45 ("THE 
JUDGE: That's the very reason I said prepare the proposed document and we'll see where 
we go with it because nothing has been accepted yet.") (emphasis added). 
8Crisman v. Hallows, 2000 UT App 104, f 8 n.3, 999 P.2d 1249 ("Because on motion for 
summary judgment the court does not make findings of fact, but rather determines only 
9 
providing "Findings," as happened here in the July 10,2002 Order. (R. 1150.) The district 
court may not weigh evidence, make credibility determinations, or otherwise resolve factual 
disputes when ruling on a summary judgment motion, Smith, 2003 UT 23, f^ 16 n.6, and, by 
definition, a court does not make findings of fact in resolving such a motion. Buzas 
Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 946 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
The July 10, 2002 Order is a summary judgment order. The Order expressly states 
that the factual recitations therein mislabeled as "Findings" were being "deemed admitted 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration [governing 
summary judgment motions] and/or pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." (R. 1149 (7/10/2002 Order) \ 1.) The July 10, 2002 Order was entered upon 
B YU's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment (B YU's Addendum 
Tab G), which was explicitly made "[pjursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56" (R. 
4331) and sought relief regarding the sale of stock in S.T.C., a return of assets allegedly 
distributed from SoftSolutions, Inc., and liability of the alleged unincorporated association 
through "[a]n order of partial summary judgment." (R. 4327-28, at ^ 3-5 (emphasis 
added).) The July 10,2002 Order was entered without any trial or evidentiary hearing, and 
without Judge Howard hearing any live testimony. There is no marshaling requirement. 
II. NONE OF THE PROCEDURAL EVENTS THAT BYU PURPORTS TO 
"MARSHAL" SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
BEFORE ENTRY OF THE JULY 10. 2002 ORDER AND BYU'S 
MARSHALING ARGUMENT ITSELF IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the undisputed 
material facts, we reject defendant's argument that plaintiffs were required to marshal the 
evidence to attack what the court labeled as findings of fact.") (emphasis added). 
10 
BYU's arguments that the requirements of due process of law were satisfied here are 
categorically without merit and defy settled constitutional jurisprudence. B YU properly bore 
the burden below to demonstrate before its entry that the July 10, 2002 Order would not 
violate the requirements of due process and its attempt to now shift that burden to appellants 
through its erroneous arguments should be rejected. As this Court has recognized in this very 
case, "'[this Court] resolve[s] all doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of a controversy.'" BYU v. Tremco. 2005 UT 19. Tf 28 (citation omitted). 
A. BYU Ignores That Due Process Requires Service, Notice, and an 
Opportunity to Be Heard Before an Issue Is Adjudicated Adversely. 
The Court should reject BYU's argument that due process was satisfied because the 
Duncan, et al. requested to be heard and defend after the July 10, 2002 Order was entered. 
(BYU's Br., Argument, Part VI.C.) 
When it comes to the constitutionally-required service, notice, and meaningful 
opportunity to be heard, timing is everything. A person is entitled to notice that a claim is 
asserted against him personally by being named as a party litigant, to be brought within the 
jurisdiction of a court through service of a summons, and to a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard on issues before issues are adjudicated adverse to him. "A fundamental requirement 
of due process is 'the opportunity to be heard.' It is an opportunity which must be granted 
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner/' Armstrong v. Manzo. 380 U.S. 545, 
552 (1965) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).9 To be meaningful, the opportunity to be 
9See also Murphv Bros.. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing. Inc.. 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999); 
Mvers v. Interwest Corp.. 632 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981) (a court "acquires jurisdiction to 
enter a judgment against a party" through service of a summons). 
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heard on an issue must occur before that issue is decided adversely. Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 
734,743 (Utah 1990) ("In our judicial system, except in extraordinary circumstances that are 
not present here, all parties are entitled to notice that particular issue is being considered by 
a court and to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue before 
decision.") (emphasis added).10 
B YU fails to grasp that there are two distinct ways in which entry of the July 10,2002 
Order violates the requirements of due process of law. The first and most obvious way is by 
failing to name, serve, or provide Duncan, et al. any hearing before the July 10,2002 Order 
itself was entered. Although B YU asserts Duncan, et al.'s requests to be heard on the Order 
constitute a waiver of the service requirement,11 every purported "general appearance[]" 
occurred after the July 10, 2002 Order was already entered. Moreover, even if the service 
requirement was waived - a fact for which no "finding" was ever made - the Order was still 
entered without providing the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard. 
The second way the July 10, 2002 Order runs afoul of due process is because it seeks 
to "retroactively alter[] or recharacteriz[e] the identity of the parties" in the underlying 
10See also Nelson v. Adams, USA, Inc.. 529 U.S. 470-71 (2000) (unanimous opinion 
reversing amendment of judgment against corporation to impose personal liability therefor 
upon shareholder of corporation when shareholder was not named a party in the case); 
Pangea Tech., Inc. v. Internet Promotions. Inc., 2004 UT 40,1J8,94 P.3d 257 ("We long ago 
succinctly summarized the fundamental features of due process, observing that it 'requires 
that notice be given to the person whose rights are to be affected. It hears before it 
condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.'") (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added); Cornish Town v. Koller, 798 P.2d 753,756 (Utah 1990) ('"[W]here notice 
is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the proceedings against him or 
not given sufficiently in advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a party is 
deprived of due process.'") (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
"See BYU's Br. at 43, Argument, Part VI.C. 
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arbitration and confirmation proceeding by imposing personal liability against Duncan, et al. 
to pay the arbitration award and 1998 Judgment B YU v. Tremco, 2005 UT 19. f 18. BYU's 
argument ignores that this Court has recognized that "B YU brought its claims for arbitration 
specifically against SoftSolutions[, Inc.]" and the 1998 Judgment resulting therefrom "was 
entered specifically against SoftSolutions[, Inc.], a corporate entity." IdL Duncan, et al. were 
never given notice in that arbitration or confirmation proceeding that B YU sought to impose 
their own personal liability for a corporate contractual debt. They had no opportunity to 
present their own personal defenses in the arbitration, in particular, because they were not 
parties to any arbitration agreement with BYU.12 They were not served any summons that 
brought them individually within the jurisdiction of the district court before the 1998 
Judgment was entered. Accordingly, even if the due process problems were somehow 
rectified before July 10, 2002, entry of the July 10, 2002 Order would still violate Duncan, 
et al.'s right to due process of law. This Court has already twice13 held that BYU's attempts 
to recharacterize the 1998 Judgment to impose liability on Tremco runs afoul of the 
12See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.. 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) ('"[Arbitration is a 
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which 
he has not agreed so to submit.'") (citations omitted). 
13First, the Court stated in BYU v. Tremco that the district court's misapplication of res 
judicata "would contravene constitutional principles of due process." 2005 UT 19, ^  24. 
Second, in its petition for rehearing, BYU asked the Court to "modify its Opinion to reflect 
that the District Court did not simply seek to enforce a judgment against a non-party without 
due process of law, because the District Court followed procedures i n . . . a separate action 
brought against Tremco." (BYU's Petition for Rehearing, Case No. 20020540, at 10 (on file 
with this Court).) This Court denied BYU's petition for rehearing and did not modify the 
Opinion in this regard, which "make[s] it abundantly clear that [the Court] found [the] 
argument unavailing," Parduhn v. Bennett. 2005 UT 22, |22,112 P.3d 495, and its holding 
that due process was violated remains law of this case. Id. f21. 
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requirements of due process and that holding applies equally and with even more force to 
BYU's similar attempt vis a vis Duncan, et al. through the July 10, 2002 Order. 
BYU's reliance on Chen v. Stewart is misplaced. (BYU's Br. at 43, Argument, Part 
VI.C.) The case stands in stark contrast to this case and actually underscores the due process 
that was not provided here. In Chen, the Court deferred to the district court's ruling that 
Madame Chen's right to due process was not violated by entry of a preliminary injunction. 
2004 UT 82, ^69 100 P.3d 1177. However, Madame Chen waived the service requirement 
of due process when her attorney entered an appearance in open court on her behalf long 
before that injunction was issued, 2004 UT 82, f 66, whereas there was no waiver of service 
here before the 1998 Judgment or the July 10, 2002 Order were entered. The notice 
requirement was satisfied in Chen because Madame Chen was actually named a party (i.e., 
a third-party defendant) to the case approximately one year before the injunction issued, kL 
%l, whereas Duncan, et al. were never made parties to the case below and were not made 
parties to the arbitration. Likewise, the meaningful-opportunity-to-be-heard requirement was 
satisfied in Chen because she was represented by counsel in eighteen out of twenty-one days 
of evidentiary hearings before the injunction was issued, 1411170-71, because Madame Chen 
was "an active participant in the hearing[s] for nearly six months," id f71, and because 
Madame Chen "had every opportunity to present evidence, call new witnesses, recall former 
witnesses for cross-examination, or to notify the trial judge of any technical or evidentiary 
objections to the trial testimony." Id In distinction, Duncan, et al. were not represented by 
counsel in the arbitration or in the district court before entry of the July 10,2002 Order, were 
not active participants in their individual capacity at any time before July 10,2002, and had 
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no opportunity to present evidence or cross examine witnesses. For this case to be even 
remotely analogous to Chen, Duncan, et al. would have to have been named parties to the 
original arbitration proceeding and represented by counsel therein. 
B. A Hearing on the Motions to Vacate the July 10, 2002 Order Does Not 
Cure the Prior Due Process Violations in Entering the Order. 
The Court should further reject BYU's assertion that due process was provided and 
the prior violations were cured by Judge Stott entertaining and permitting oral argument on 
Duncan, et al.'s post-judgment motion to vacate the July 10,2002 Order filed in connection 
with their motion to intervene. (BYU's Br. at 34-35,42-43, (Argument Parts II.B & VLB.) 
As the United States Supreme Court has expressly held, when an order is entered in violation 
of the requirements of due process, the violation is not cured by providing the aggrieved 
person a hearing on a motion to set aside the offending Order. Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 551,14 
In Armstrong, the Court held an order entered without notice or providing an 
opportunity for the adverse person to be heard 'Violated the most rudimentary demands of 
due process of law." I<1 at 550. Thereafter the adverse person moved to set aside the order 
and a hearing was provided where he "introduced evidence, through witnesses and by 
depositions." Id, at 549. Despite the hearing, the Armstrong court squarely, and 
unanimously, held the violation was not cured, especially when, as here, the motion to set 
aside was denied. Id at 552 ("The trial court could have fully accorded this right [to be 
1416B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 931 (2nd ed. 1998) ("A violation of a person's right 
to due process by failing to give him or her notice of the pendency of proceedings is not 
cured by granting the person a hearing on his or her motion to set aside the decree.") 
(emphasis added) 
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heard] only by granting his motion to set aside the decree and consider the case anew."). 
As the Armstrong court correctly reasoned, the filing of a motion to set aside an order 
does not place a person in the same position they would have been had they been properly 
named, served, and provided a meaningful hearing in the first place and, therefore, does not 
cure the prior due process violation. Id at 551-52. For example, ifBYU had properly named 
and served Duncan, et al. at the outset, BYU, as plaintiff, would have been required to 
present evidence proving at trial its allegations and claims embodied in the July 10, 2002 
Order by a preponderance of the evidence or, in the case of a fraudulent transfer claim, clear 
and convincing evidence.15 In addition, because the July 10, 2002 Order was entered 
pursuant to B YU's Rule 56 summary judgment motion, BYU also would have been required 
to bear the burden to demonstrate an absence of dispute as to material facts precluding trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56. BYU did not bear this burden on the motions to vacate the Order. 
In distinction to defending against the initial entry of an order, a person seeking to 
have a previously-entered order set aside bears a heavy burden.16 District courts, guided by 
the interests of judicial economy and the demands of heavy dockets, are reluctant to set aside 
an order previously entered, even when it may have been entered in error.17 Because courts 
15See Barker v.Dunham. 9 Utah 2d 244,246,342 P.2d 867, 868 (1959) ("The appellant has 
an additional burden in this case to prove a fraudulent conveyance, which requires clear and 
convincing evidence."); Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 UT App 373, f 18, 993 P.2d 884 ("A 
creditor who claims a debtor transferred property with actual intent to defraud under section 
25-6-5(l)(a) must establish that claim by clear and convincing evidence."). 
16Cf H. James Clegg, Post-Trial Motions, 8 Utah B.J. 48,48 (November 1995) ("[Ojne must 
battle the inertia of the trial couifs mind . . . . Thus, the movant generally has hat-in-hand 
and heart-in-throat when he or she argues a post-trial motion."). 
17See Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc., 761 P.2d 42,44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (explaining that motions to reconsider are disfavored and "[o]nce the judge has 
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are also mindful of the policies underpinning the law of the case doctrine, this reluctance is 
even greater when, as in this case, the prior order was entered by a different judge.18 See 
Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 551 ("[T]he petitioner was faced on his first appearance in the 
courtroom with the task of overcoming an adverse decree entered by one judge, based upon 
a finding . . . made by another judge.")- Indeed, even when a movant seeks to have an order 
set aside on the grounds that it was rendered without jurisdiction, the movant still bears the 
burden to prove an absence of jurisdiction. Department of Soc. Servs. v. Vigil 784 P,2d 
1130, 1133 (Utah 1989). 
Accordingly, under Armstrong, because Duncan, et al. were not put by the motions 
to vacate the July 10, 2002 Order in the same position as they would have been had the 
requirements of due process been originally satisfied, a hearing on those motions does not 
cure the original error of Judge Howard in entering the July 10, 2002 Order. 
C. Neither Actual Knowledge of the Underlying Proceedings nor Attending 
the April 10, 2002 Oral Argument Satisfies Due Process, 
Contrary to BYU's arguments, due process is not satisfied merely because the 
shareholders/officers of SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco (i.e. Duncan, et al.) had knowledge 
of the arbitration/confirmation proceeding or the case BYU filed against Tremco. (BYU's 
Br. at 42, Argument Part VI.B.) Actual knowledge of proceedings in which a person has not 
been named a party and where a plaintiff has not alleged a substantive claim against her does 
decided, the system assumes he or she has decided correctly and would decide the same way 
again."). 
18One of BYU's primary arguments to Judge Stott against the motions to vacate was that the 
merits of the July 10, 2002 Order could not be revisited under the law of the case doctrine. 
(R. 1771-72 (opposing Tremco's motion to vacate under the law of the case doctrine).) 
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not provide the required notice that the person must appear and defend: 
[I]t is a rule as old as the law that no one shall be personally bound until he or 
she has had a day in court, by which is meant until he or she has been duly 
cited to appear and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment 
without such citation and opportunity lacks all the attributes of judicial 
determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression and can never be 
upheld where justice is fairly administered. 
16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 902 (2nd ed. 1998) (citing Richards v. Jefferson 
County. 517 U.S. 793 (1996)) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Moreover, if a person 
has actual knowledge that a proceeding exists, he is entitled to rely upon the fact that he has 
not been named a party litigant or served a summons therein: 
"[W]here a jurisdictional notice is required to be given in a certain manner, 
any means other than that prescribed is ineffective. This is so even 
though the intended recipient of that notice does in fact acquire the 
knowledge contemplated by the law. Such a rule is no mere 'legal 
technicality' rather it is a fundamental safeguard assuring each citizen that 
he will be afforded due process of law. Nor may the requirement be 
relaxed merely because of a showing that certain complaining parties 
did have actual notice of the proceeding." 
Salt Lake County v. Murray Citv Redevelopment 598 P.2d 1339,1345 (Utah 1979) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). Even if Duncan, et al. had a right to intervene in the arbitration 
or the case B YU filed against Tremco, because they did not do so, "[they are] not bound by 
the judgment." Baxter v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1985); cf 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1960) (vacating the 
judgment against Hazeltine because it was not named as a party or served, even though, as 
the parent corporation of one of the parties, it undoubtedly knew of the claim against it). 
In addition, contrary to BYU's assertions, Kenneth Duncan and Lee Duncan did not 
personally appear in the case before entry of the July 10,2002 Order in a manner that would 
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waive their right to first be named parties, served process, and provided an opportunity to be 
heard on BYU's allegations before being held personally liable to pay the 1998 Judgment 
against SoftSolutions, Inc. (See BYU's Br. at 42 (Argument, Part VI, A).) This Court has 
specifically rejected the notion that a person is bound by a judgment merely because they 
were present in the courtroom as a witness and could have sought to intervene as a party. 
Baxter. 705 P.2d at 1169 (declining to follow "a few jurisdictions [which] hold that a party 
who does nothing more than appear as a witness is bound by the action"). Here, although 
Messrs. Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia - none of whom are lawyers - were present at the oral 
argument on the summary judgment motions held before Judge Howard on April 10,2002, 
Tremco's counsel made it clear they were present in their capacity as Tremco's officers.19 
No attorney for Messrs. Duncan'or Tedjamulia attended that oral argument. (R. 3943 (Tr. 
4/10/2002) at 2-3.) Moreover, the presence of these three non-lawyer individuals cannot be 
a pro se appearance by the corporate entities KWD, Julee, and AST. Tracy Burke Assocs. 
v. Department of Employment Sec. 699 P.2d 687, 687 (Utah 1985) ("'[I]n matters in court 
[corporate entities] can act only through licensed attorneys.'") (per curiam) (citation omitted). 
D. Appellants Are Not Required to Marshal the Evidence Supporting Judge 
Stott's Ruling That the July 10.2002 Order Did Not Violate Due Process. 
l9The transcript of that oral argument provides: 
THE JUDGE:. . . So that we can have a good record of who's here, could I 
ask counsel to make your appearance, please. 
MR. GAUFIN: Sam Gaufin and Eric Schnibbe on behalf of Tremco. And Your 
Honor, if I may, there are three representatives of Tremco present -
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. GAUFIN: They are . . . Ken Duncan, Alvin Tedjamlia and Lee Duncan. 
(R. 3943 (Tr. 4/10/2002) at 3 (emphasis added).) 
19 
This Court should reject B YU's argument that appellants are required to marshal the 
evidence supporting the ruling by Judge Stott that 'there ha[d] been no due process violations 
by Judge Howard as to the July 10, 200[2] order." (R. 8580 (Tr. 7/22/2003) at 79-80.) 
First, on this direct appeal by Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc., the Court is asked to 
review whether Judge Howard erred in entering the July 10,2002 Order - not whether Judge 
Stott erred in denying the motions to vacate it. See supra. Argument, Part LA. Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82,100 P.3d 1177, on which BYU relies, arose from a different procedural 
posture. In Chen, Madame Chen appealed only from the district court's ruling on a motion 
to vacate prior orders appointing an interim CEO and imposing a preliminary injunction; her 
appeal was not from entry of those orders in the first place. 2004 UT 82, ^ [17, f63. Unlike 
Chen, the due process error was preserved for appellate review in this case before the Order 
was entered, in Tremco's papers opposing BYU's summary judgment motions, in Tremco's 
and SoftSolutions, Inc.'s timely objections to the Order in its proposed form, and in open 
court on April 10, 2002. As Tremco's counsel, Samuel O. Gaufin, stated to Judge Howard: 
Your Honor, I don't represent SI [SoftSolutions, Inc.]. I had no involvement 
in this case prior to the involvement of Tremco. The only defendant named in 
this case is Tremco. The individuals, are entitled, if relief is to be sought 
against them as individuals, to have a chance to be named and heard on claims 
that claim fraudulent conveyance. Mr. Call admitted that. 
(R. 3943 (Tr. 4/10/2002) at 99 (emphasis added).) Judge Howard made no factual findings 
as to whether Duncan, et al. had been afforded due process of law and, as a result, there can 
be no marshaling requirement on this appeal from entry of the July 10, 2002 Order.20 
20Even if the Court was asked to review Judge Stott's ultimate conclusion that there were no 
due process violations with entry of the July 10,2002 Order and even if that legal conclusion 
20 
Second, BYU's reliance in this regard on Chen is further misplaced because the Chen 
court imposed the clearly erroneous standard, and accompanying marshaling requirement, 
only with regard to 'the necessary subsidiary factual determinations." Id. [^ 25. The Chen 
court reiterated that the ultimate determination of whether the requirements of due process 
have been satisfied is still a question of law, not fact, which this Court reviews for 
correctness. Id ("Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due process, are 
questions of law that we review for correctness."). 
In Chen, the district court made specific subsidiary factual findings that were 
determinative of the motion to vacate under review. Those included that Madame Chen 
waived her right to object to appointment of an interim CEO, 2004 UT 82, fflf 31-32, and that 
madame Chen waived her right to service by voluntarily appearing "in the early stages" of 
the case. L± f 70-71. In this case, however, there are no factual findings by either Judge 
Howard or Judge Stott that are dispositive of whether entry of the July 10, 2002 Order 
violated the requirements of due process of law. In this case, the dispositive and "necessary 
subsidiary factual determinations" are a matter of record, are not in dispute, and are not 
addressed by any finding of fact. There is no dispute that Duncan, et al. were not named 
parties to the arbitration between SoftSolutions, Inc. and B YU. They were not parties to the 
1990 License Agreement containing an arbitration clause. They were not served any process 
bringing them within the jurisdiction of the district court in the proceedings to confirm the 
was mischaracterized as a finding of fact, Judge Stott's determination was nonetheless clearly 
erroneous because every procedural event that BYU asserts supports Judge Stott's ruling, 
unquestionably does not satisfy the requirements due process. See supra Argument, Part 
II.A-C. 
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arbitration award. They were never named parties in the January 2000 Complaint that BYU 
filed against Tremco. BYU never alleged a claim against them prior to it serving the July 10, 
2002 Order in its proposed form. They were never provided an opportunity to contest their 
liability or assert defenses before the July 10, 2002 Order was entered. When these 
dispositive facts are not in dispute and not addressed by any factual finding, the marshaling 
requirement described in Chen cannot apply. 
IIL BYU'S NEW THEORY CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS ON WHICH TO 
AFFIRM THE JULY 10. 2002 ORDER BECAUSE IT IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BELOW. AND IS REFUTED BY EVIDENCE 
APPELLANTS WOULD PRESENT IF DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED. 
The Court should reject BYU's categorical distortion of the July 10,2002 Order by 
asserting a new receipt-of-assets claim, which was neither articulated in the Order nor argued 
to Judge Howard in the summary judgment motion resulting in the Order. In essence, BYU 
concedes that the substantive theories relied upon in the July 10, 2002 Order are not 
consistent with Utah law and contravene "elementary principles of corporate law" that 
"officers and stockholders of corporations... are not personally bound by judgments against 
those corporations." BYU v. Tremco, 2005 UT 19, f 37. 
Rather than demonstrate why affirming the Order would be appropriate based upon 
the theories of liability actually expressed therein and upon the evidence actually before 
Judge Howard at the time the Order was entered, BYU now advances a new theory of 
liability regarding Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408. However, BYU's new theory cannot 
sustain the July 10, 2002 Order rendered pursuant to BYU's summary judgment motion 
against Tremco because it is not supported by undisputed facts before Judge Howard and 
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relies upon adverse inferences. Further, the factual basis of BYU's new theory is false. 
BYU now asserts that the stock in S.T.C. was not actually owned by KWD, Julee, 
AST, and the LDS Church - the entities that received payment for the shares. Rather, BYU 
asserts (1) that S.T.C. was a "wholly owned subsidiary of SoftSolutions, Inc." (BYU's Br. 
at 46-49, Argument Part IX.A-B.); (2) that SoftSolutions, Inc. continued to own the stock of 
S.T.C. after SoftSolutions, Inc. was administratively dissolved (BYU's Br. at 50-51, 
Argument Part IX.D-E.); and (3) that payment by WordPerfect to KWD, Julee, and AST for 
the stock, rather than to SoftSolutions, Inc., constitutes a distribution of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s 
assets to SoftSolutions, Inc.'s shareholders; and (4) because BYU was a creditor of 
SoftSolutions, Inc. through the 1990 License Agreement (later reduced to the 1998 
Judgment) at the time of said distribution to shareholders, BYU is entitled to enforce its 
claim against such shareholders to the extent they received SoftSolutions, Inc.'s assets 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408. (BYU's Br. at 49-50, Argument Part IX.B-C.) 
This new theory cannot sustain a summary judgment order because the record does 
not contain evidence demonstrating an absence of dispute as to the predicate facts. This 
Court only affirms an order upon a theory not expressed therein "in limited circumstances" 
and 64where the alternate ground is apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles. 2002 UT 58, 
f 20, 52 P.3d 1158. BYU failed to submitted a single sworn statement in connection with its 
summary judgment motion against Tremco and it points to no evidence now that was before 
Judge Howard and that supports the predicate facts, let alone evidence that would have 
established there was no dispute as to those purported facts. Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
In addition, the purported evidence BYU does rely upon, which was not part of the 
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record below, fails to establish its new theory as a matter of law. To show that SoftSolutions, 
Inc. actually owned the S.T.C. stock that was sold to WordPerfect in January 1994, BYU 
relies, first, upon a shareholder resolution of S.T.C. and, second, upon a supplemental 
examination transcript.21 The shareholder resolution for S.T.C, however, is only evidence 
that SoftSolutions, Inc. was the shareholder of S.T.C. on the date of the resolution - April 
9, 1990. Likewise, the cited testimony only supports that SoftSolutions, Inc. was the 
shareholder of S.T.C. 44when it [S.T.C] was incorporated" in 1989. (BYU's Br. at 46.) 
Neither the resolution, nor the examination establish as an undisputed fact necessary to 
support a summary judgment order that SoftSolutions, Inc. remained an S.T.C shareholder 
through the times actually relevant to BYU's theory - i.e., at the time the 1990 License 
Agreement was entered, at the time the license was assigned to S.T.C, or at the time the 
S.T.C. stock was sold to WordPerfect. That conclusion can only be reached by accepting 
disputed inferences favorable to a summary judgment movant, which Rule 56 prohibits. 
Moreover, the fact is SoftSolutions, Inc. did not own the stock in S.T.C at any time 
relevant to BYU's new theory because the shares owned by SoftSolutions, Inc. were 
transferred to KWD, AST, and Julee by April 10,1990.22 Attached in the Addendum hereto 
as Exh. 3 is another corporate resolution of S.T.C that was adopted on April 10, 1990,23 
21By BYU's own admission, even to date, BYU has never provided the shareholder resolution 
to the district court. (BYU's Br. 48 n. 11.) The supplemental examination transcript was not 
filed with the district court until August 25, 2003. (R. 4934-35.) 
^The 1990 License Agreement was entered June 1,1990. (R. 60 (enclosed in Tremco's prior 
Addendum as Exhibit 7).) 
^The April 10,1990 resolution was not made part of the record below but would have been 
had BYU actually asserted its new theory below or followed the requirements of due process 
by naming and providing an opportunity to be heard to the persons targeted in the July 10, 
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during the same annual meeting as the resolution on which BYU relies, and provides: 
CHANGE IN SHAREHOLDERS: 
The persons in the meeting discussed negotiations which have occurred 
whereby SoftSolutions, Inc., the corporation's prior sole shareholder, 
assigned and transferred its shares of stock. After discussion and review of an 
Assignment and Bill of Sale, the Directors approved and noted the effect of 
this transfer and noted that the shareholders of the corporation [S.T.C] are 
now KWD Associates, Ltd, 600 shares, AST Associates, Ltd., 250 shares, and 
Julee Associates, Ltd., 150 shares. 
(Emphasis added.) Because SoftSolutions, Inc. was never a shareholder of S.T.C. after the 
1990 Agreement was entered, BYU's new theory fails.24 It is not factually true that 
SoftSolutions, Inc. continued to own the stock of S.T.C. after SoftSolutions, Inc. was 
administratively dissolved in 1992. It is not true that payment by WordPerfect to KWD, 
Julee & AST for the S.T.C. stock constitutes a distribution of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s assets to 
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s shareholders. And, even assuming the original change in ownership of 
S.T.C. was a distribution to SoftSolutions, Inc.'s shareholders, it is not true that BYU was 
a creditor of SoftSolutions, Inc. through the 1990 Agreement at the time of the distribution. 
(BYU's Br. at 49-50, Argument Part IX.B-C.) Rather, it is clear that at the time the 1990 
Agreement was entered, at the time the license was assigned to S.T.C, and at the time the 
S.T.C. stock was sold to WordPerfect, SoftSolutions, Inc. was not a shareholder of S.T.C. 
BYU's other arguments in this regard either fail or are irrelevant because 
SoftSolutions, Inc. never owned the S.T.C. stock after April 10, 1990, including when the 
2002 Order before imposing liability upon them. This resolution should be considered if the 
Court considers the resolution cited by BYU which was likewise not part of the record. 
24The change in S.T.C.'s shareholders was before S.T.C. had become a valuable business. 
As of March 31, 1991, the end of S.T.C.'s 1990 fiscal year, S.T.C. still had a negative net 
worth totaling $220,632. 
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1990 Agreement was entered. BYU's argument that ownership of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s 
property cannot devolve to its shareholders without first paying creditors claims (B YU's Br. 
at 51-52, Argument Part IX.F) is irrelevant because BYU was not a creditor under the 1990 
Agreement at any time that the stock in S.T.C. was property of SoftSolutions, Inc. Whether 
the former Rule 69(s) permits execution upon property actually owned by SoftSolutions, Inc. 
but held by another (BYU's Br. at 53, Argument Part IX.G) is irrelevant because 
SoftSolutions, Inc. did not own the stock of S.T.C. at any time after the 1990 Agreement was 
entered and the proceeds from the sale of that stock was never property of SoftSolutions, Inc. 
IV. BYU'S FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ARGUMENTS DO NOT SUPPORT 
AFFIRMING THE JULY 10. 2002 ORDER BECAUSE THEY RELY UPON 
THE NOW-REVERSED MAY 14, 2002 RULING AND JUNE 13. 2002 
JUDGMENT AGAINST TREMCO. 
The Court should disregard BYU's arguments regarding fraudulent transfer as support 
for the July 10, 2002 Order. (BYU's Br. at 53-58, Argument Part IX.H-J.) 
First, BYU's arguments that the assignment of the 1990 Agreement and/or sale of 
stock to WordPerfect were fraudulent transfers beg the question on appeal. BYU does not 
recite facts demonstrated by the evidence before Judge Howard that would show an absence 
of disputed material facts or support declaring the transactions fraudulent transfers as a 
matter of law. BYU merely recites facts as alleged in its Complaint against Tremco (and 
denied by Tremco), as well as in the May 14, 2002 Ruling and June 13, 2002 Judgment 
against Tremco, without regard to whether they were supported by any evidence. No citation 
in BYU's Brief in this regard is to evidence actually before Judge Howard. 
Second, BYU relies, almost exclusively, upon the May 14,2002 Ruling to argue the 
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license assignment and stock sale should be considered fraudulent transfers of SoftSolutions, 
Inc.'s and/or S.T.C.'s property. That reliance is unquestionably misplaced. In BYU v. 
Tremco, this Court reviewed Judge Howard's reliance upon the Fraudulent Transfer Act as 
a basis for imposing liability against Tremco and reversed that Ruling, holding that Judge 
Howard erred in relying upon the Fraudulent Transfer Act at all. 2005 UT 19, f 23. 
Third, BYU's reliance upon the reversed May 14,2002 Ruling actually demonstrates 
that the July 10,2002 Order was vacated by operation of law with the Court's reversal of the 
judgment against Tremco.25 Because BYU must look to the reversed Ruling to support the 
merits of the July 10, 2002 Order, BYU underscores that the Order is not separate from the 
Judgment against Tremco, as BYU contends (BYU's Br. at 43-44), but rather is intertwined 
with and predicated upon that reversed ruling and June 13, 2002 Judgment.26 
V. THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD BYU'S MISREPRESENTATIONS OF 
THE UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 
Just as it did in BYU v. Tremco, this Court should disregard BYU's Statement of the 
Case and other factual assertions because BYU improperly recites BYU's view of the facts, 
taking all inferences in its favor, when this is an appeal from entry of an order expressly 
entered pursuant to Rule 56 and BYU's summary judgment motion. Moreover, to cloud very 
25This Court has squarely held that "[a] reversal of a judgment or decision of a lower court 
. . . places the case in the position it was before the lower court rendered that judgment or 
decision, and vacates all proceedings and orders dependent upon the decision which was 
reversed." Phebus v. Dunford, 114 Utah 292, 294, 198 P.2d 973, 974 (1948). 
26
 While this case was pending before the Utah Court of Appeals, the parties fully briefed in 
Tremco's suggestion of partial mootness whether the July 10, 2002 Order was vacated by 
operation of law with the BYU v. Tremco reversal, the Utah Court of Appeals deferred its 
ruling in this regard pending plenary presentation of the case. 
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clear issues as to limited corporate liability and the requirements of due process of law, B YU 
makes repeated misrepresentations as to the underlying facts and proceedings. Tremco will 
not burden this Court with a full laundry list of all the false, misleading, and unsupported 
statements described in B YU's Brief, which would fill volumes, but rather responds to only 
a few examples to illustrate the categorical obfuscation wrought by BYU's Brief. 
A. At the Time of the Stock Sale. DSearch Was Not an Asset of S.T.C. Let 
Alone S.T.C.'s Only Asset. 
The Court should reject BYU's repeated false assertions that WordPerfect sought to 
purchase DSearch and that DSearch was S.T.C.'s only asset at the time of the stock sale.27 
The DSearch algorithm was only one small part of a searching and retrieval function that, in 
turn, was only a small part of S.T.C.'s overall document management software package, and 
DSearch had to be removed from that software because it was defective.28 As Judge Howard 
acknowledged, by July 1993 - six months before the stock sale - DSearch had been removed 
from all S.T.C.'s software "and replaced with a routine available in the public domain." 
(R2000.37.) S.T.C. became a valuable going concern business, not because of DSearch, but 
in spite of DSearch, and because S.T.C.'s principals and employees devoted creativity and 
countless hours to develop S.T.C.'s software from which DSearch was removed. The price 
27(E.g.« BYU's Br. at 16, f 15 ("WordPerfect was interested in purchasing STC, including 
its sole asset D-Search "); at 57 ("thereafter STC's sole asset[], i.e., the license rights 
obtained from B YU were sold to WordPerfect".) 
28To the extent the Court may credit any of BYU's false representations that the entire value 
of S.T.C. was its right to use DSearch or that DSearch was valuable for its "indexing and 
information retrieval capabilities" (B YU's Br. at 13), the Court should also consider the letter 
enclosed in the Addendum hereto as Exh. 4, which is one of many complaints from S.T.C.'s 
customers showing DSearch could not handle large databases, as BYU represented. 
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paid for S.T.C.'s stock represented the value of the company without DSearch. 
B. Contrary to BYU's Improper Intimation, the $1.000.000 Contingency 
Account Went to Novell, not to Tedjamulia, Ken Duncan or Lee Duncan, 
BYU is less than forthright with regard to S.T.C.'s general contingency account with 
First Interstate Bank that grew to approximately $1,000,000 by 1996. BYU states "Alvin 
Tedjamulia and Lee Duncan transferred the money set aside to satisfy BYU's claims and 
closed that account." (BYU's Br. at 17, 59.) Aside from the account not being specifically 
earmarked for BYU, BYU's intimation that Tedjamulia and Lee Duncan took it is false. 
While the account was closed in February 1996, BYU fails to disclose that, at the time, 
Tedjamulia and Lee Duncan were employed by Novell (which then owned S.T.C.) and were 
acting at Novell's direction. Also, BYU fails to disclose that the money in the account was 
transferred to Novell, not to Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia, or Lee Duncan.29 BYU further 
ignores that SoftSolutions, Inc. asked Novell to pay that money to BYU and that BYU made 
the choice not to pursue either S.T.C. (as assignee under the 1990 Agreement) or Novell 
(who received the money in the account) for payment of the $1,000,000.30 
C. It Is Not True That "No Timely Objection Was Made" to the July 10. 
2002 Order.31 
Contrary to BYU's assertions, both Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. both timely 
objected to the July 10, 2002 Order. Tremco opposed BYU's summary judgment motion 
29
 Enclosed in the Addendum hereto as Exh. 5 is a copy of the February 8, 1996 letter 
directing the funds be transferred to Novell. 
30
 Enclosed in the Addendum hereto as Exh. 6 is a copy of a letter from SoftSolutions, Inc.'s 
counsel to Novell, asking that the funds be used to pay the arbitration award. 
31(BYU's Br. at 9; accord BYU's Br. at 21, 39.) 
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and, because the July 10, 2002 Order relied upon new materials BYU sought to introduce 
through written motion, the ten-day period of former Rule 4-501 (not the five-day period of 
4-504) applied and any opposition was due July 12,2002. (Tremco's Opening Br. at 9 n.7.) 
Tremco filed its opposition July 11,2002. (R. 1155-92.) Further, because BYU never served 
its summary judgment motion or the proposed July 10,2002 Order upon SoftSolutions, Inc., 
BYU failed to trigger the time period for SoftSolutions, Inc. to respond and, as a result, it 
never expired. UtahR. Jud. Admin 4-501 (now repealed). Nonetheless, SoftSolutions, Inc. 
still filed a timely objection on July 12, 2002. (R. 1201-1391.) 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and as expressed in Tremco's opening Brief, this Court 
should reverse the July 10, 2002 Order entered by Judge Howard and should reverse Judge 
Stott's ruling that it was not improper for BYU's counsel to obtain the lifting of a stay of 
execution through its counsel's ex parte communications. 
DATED this 29th day of March, 2006. 
TOMSIC & PECK, LLC A 
Eric K. Schnibbe (8463) 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc. 
30 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the within and foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT TREMCO LEGAL SOLUTIONS, INC. to be served via 
mail, postage prepaid, this 29th day of March 2006, as follows: 
Steven W. Call, Esq. 
Michael D. Mayfield 
Benjamin J. Kotter 
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1. Notice of Oral Arguments (dated June 11, 2003) 
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5. February 8, 1996 letter from A. Tedjamulia and L. Duncan to First 
Interstate Bank 
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Case No: 960400497 CV 
Judge: GARY D. STOTT 
Date: June 11,2003 
ORAL ARGUMENTS is scheduled. 
Date: 07/22/2003 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Check daily calendar 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
before Judge GARY D. STOTT 
Dated this // day of i jU/tVL-
D i s t r i c t C 
&P-1*'*, 
Deptaty Clerk 
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER, PLEASE NOTIFY THE COUR«r 
(801)429-1046(five days before your hearing, if possible). In all 
criminal cases and in some other proceedings, the court will 
arrange for the interpreter and will pay the interpreter's fees. 
You must use an interpreter from the list provided by the court. 
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Judge Gary D. Stott 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on September 21, 2004. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(From Electronic CD Recording) 
©FY 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. 22-102811-7801 
SALEM, UT 84653 



























afterward, I would like to request an extension. 
THE JUDGE: I haven't seen what was filed nine 
days ago. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Okay. It's just that I had a 
vacation scheduled for the last six months, I've been out of 
town, been out of the office and haven't had a chance. So 
if need be I'd like to address that after Your Honor has 
ruled. Okay. 
THE JUDGE: So where is the problem with the time 
frame then? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: It would be due tomorrow and I 
returned to town yesterday so... 
THE JUDGE: So how much time do you need? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: A week. 
THE JUDGE: You've got it. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
RULING 
THE JUDGE: I have no, I have no intention now nor 
did I at the time of the, we initially discussed this, these 
issues here to allow amending of a complaint with respect to 
Tremco. 
MR. CALL: And it's our understanding that we 
haven't amended as to Tremco, we're willing to stipulate 
that— 




























grant that leave we could be working on that and doing that. 
We have no objection to that. 
THE JUDGE: Well based upon the discussion here 
and my observations to you I'll ask that you, that you submit 
to counsel a proposed complaint and execution to see if it 
can be agreed upon and to send a copy of it to me. 
MR. CALL: And with respect, Your Honor, to the, 
the pleading that was filed, the original complaint was not 
solely against Tremco, the complaint was consolidated into 
this action identified these parties holding the WordPerfect 
proceeds as John Does 1 through 10, and we actually alleged a 
fraudulent transfer of constructive trust in that pleading. 
And so in our most recent supplemental complaint we're just 
identifying John Does— 
THE JUDGE: But you brought in new people. You 
added new parties. 
MR. CALL: That's true, we did. And we did that 
based on the request that was made as to whether we could add 
other claims. If the court wants us to dismiss those 
parties and join them in a supplemental sort of writ 
proceeding we could do that. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Mr. Schnibbe, do you have a 
comment? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Yes, Your Honor. I believe we've 




























Utah 12 at paragraph 9 Utah Supreme Court, a pleading filed, 
an amended pleading filed without leave is a nullity. 
Therefore there's nothing before the court. There's word 
processing technology. It could be very simple to excerpt 
out the parts that are objectionable— 
THE JUDGE: That's the very reason I said prepare 
the proposed document and we'll see where we go with it 
because nothing has been accepted yet. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: That's the reason I couched my, my 
reference to that document in that fashion. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: I want the proposed document filed. 
You send a copy to me. If there's an objection to the 
proposed document then I'll hear it. If there's not I'll 
approve it. And a, we'll see where we go with respect to 
your proposal. 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, with respect, if I could 
just have a moment of the court's time, with respect to the 
pleading that's been filed we're purporting to identify those 
parties in the complaint. Counsel has argued that the 
statute of limitations is a defense to the writ of 
execution. We have a right under Rule 15 to identify the 
names of the John Does that were alleged in that complaint. 




MINUTES OF THE COMBINED ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PERFECTSOLUTION CORPORATION, FORMERLY 
SOFTSOLUTIONS MARKETING, INC., A UTAH CORPORATION, HELD AT THE 
OFFICES OF THE CORPORATION IN OREM, UTAH, ON APRIL 10, 1990, 
PURSUANT TO PERSONAL NOTICE TO EACH DIRECTOR. 
PERSONS PRESENT: 
Kenneth W. Duncan, individually and representing KWD Associates, 
Ltd. 
Alvin S. Tedjamulia, individually and representing AST 
Associates, Ltd. 
Lee A. Duncan, individually and representing Julee Associates, 
Ltd. 
WAIVER OF NOTICE: 
The attendance of each Shareholder and Director at this 
meeting is an acknowledgement of and constitutes receipt of 
notice of the time and place of the meeting. 
ELECTION OF OFFICERS: 
On motion duly made and carried and by the unanimous vote of 
all present, the following officers were elected: 
PRESIDENT: Kenneth W. Duncan 
VICE-PRESIDENT: Lee A. Duncan 
SECRETARY/ 
TREASURER: Alvin S. Tedjamulia 
CHANGE IN SHAREHOLDERS: 
The persons in the meeting discussed negotiations which have 
occurred whereby SoftSolutions, Inc., the corporation's prior 
sole shareholder, assigned and transferred its shares of stock. 
After discussion and review of an Assignment and Bill of Sale, 
the Directors approved and noted the effect of this transfer and 
noted that the shareholders of the corporation are now KWD 
Associates, Ltd, 600 shares, AST Associates, Ltd., 250 shares, 
and Julee Associates, Ltd., 150 shares. The officers and 
directors were instructed to take the necessary actions formally 
to reflect the changes in shareholders and to ensure the issuance 
of certificates of stock accordingly. 
BUSINESS OF THE CORPORATION: 
The Directors reviewed the actions of the Shareholders at 
the annual meeting of Shareholders held earlier in the day. It 
was noted that the discussion at that meeting involved the 
Directors and that the business of the corporation was discussed 
in detail at that meeting. 
After discussionf the Directors unanimously ratified and 
confirmed all of the actions of the officers of the corporation 
since the last meeting of Directors, 
Kenneth W. Duncan, as Director 
and for KWD Associates, Ltd. 
tk4^**£ 
Alvin S, Tedjamulia, as 
Director and for AST 
Associates, Ltd. 
A, Duncan, as Director and 
ix Julee Associates, Ltd, 
2 
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Mr. Lee Duncan 
Vice President 
PartcView Plaia 
625 Sooth Stole Street 
Oem, UT 84058 
Dear Lee: 
We fcaw discovered & aeriros pfoblem wi^ 
made aware of . We are currently running verskm 3.0& ^ 
limit in our Lot Angeles office. We are extrandy concerned about diis since we were led to 
bcUcve that SoftSohrtkxu could handle hundreds of thousands of documents and we've only 
nached 150,000. 
When nmnit^ g a compaction on (be LA. iftrtwrfj, as error it generated that loo many 
references are made to the words 00001, 89900, 103, PUBLIC, GEN, and LTBL Hie 
compaction is aborted bot the index is left intact. John Stambek*, manager of our MIS 
dqpartni^ He was 
told that them Is a problem with a 32-bit array in version 3.0. Once fte anay hits a 97% 
threshold, the compactor won't wort Version 3.1 has a 64~bit array and can handle more 
references to words than the 324rit vexsion. John was told las options am to 1) upgrade to 
SoftSoIutions3a, or 2) add the "problem-words to the ^  We aren't happy with either 
option* 
We are hesitant to nicyvc to version 3 J ontfl 
Every time we have upgraded to a new v ^ 
been plagued with bugs. When this happens, our usm lose fi^ in the document i ^ ^ 
in our staff. We want to wak unffl the fim nointaiaiic^ 
we're satisfied that a firm with a s a b l e dataset has made the conversion and are having no 
problems. We also don*t want to add the above 
them are part of the document path. We We had the experience in the past where putting a wotf 
U M A M « C U S , C A 
NCfttf YORK* #IV 
A v*m jammmim* iwcuirwun 
KATTEN MUCHIN & ZAVIS 
Mr. Lee Duncan 
September 23, 1993 
F*ge2 
in the stop list thai is refataaced in the path c ^ ^ Client numbers 
arepartof the data path and two of those numbers are showi^ Putting client 
numbers in the Hop list makes the field useless, 
Another m u m we're hesitant to move to version 3.1 is that the problem ham't teen 
fixed - the limk has just been increased. Ites is very woodsome. We aren't doing full text 
uuteringiiowbutif weeverwant toin thefut^^ 
references thai can be marie to ^ecific words? Being a law firm* we will have a lot erf words 
that are wed over and over again that we aright not want in a stop fist Also, do we have to 
monitor the size of our dataaets so that ooce ftey reach a certain limit we have to start new 
one*? John Stambck* was told by Mark Wart that SoftSotutions has been aware 
far over a year, yet we have never heart of the poss3ri% I think theae limits 
are serious enough to turn away prospective hose clients. It's definitely something I would 
caution against when asked for iny opinion. 
Another question I have is what happens if we decide not to move to 3.1? Will our 
arrays hit 100* and if so, what happens then? Are profiles no longer indexed? 
Katten Mochin & Zavis has made a commitment to SoftSoiutkws oyer the" past three 
yean, but tiiis jwoblem cames us great concern. We need a product that can handle a laige 
number of profiles and documents. We can place Band-Aids to cootmoe wodring for now but 
tte problem wffl eventually affixtattekvea of ra We would Hke 
to know what SoASolutions plans to do about this problem, both now sad in the future, 
I wilibeout of the office Monday, Septenber 27, fluo^h Tuesday, October 5
 t»o if you 
hav^ any questions in the meantime p i ^ conta^ I will 
phone yo& when I get back to the office. Thank yon for your attention to tins matter* 
Sincerely, 
Manager, Applications Development 
/mgd 





s^  i i v r c L L 
February 8, 1996 
First Interstate Bank of Utah 
Attn Patrick Vargecko 
6 6 E 1650N 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Dear Patrick, 
Due to some restructuring at Novell Inc, it is necessary to close the SoftSolutions Technology 
Corporation account (#420\66%J) with First Interstate Bank This account came to Novell as 
part of a corporate acquisition of SoftSolutions (Tax ED 87-0477094) and is not being used now 
that the two companies have become one 
Please close tins account and include any interest that is due in the transaction and transfer the 
balance (approximately $950,000) to Novell Inc. The transfer instructions are. 
First Security Bank 




Thank you for your help in this matter 
Sincerely, 
AJvin S Tedjarmilia 
Vice President 
/ L e e A. Duncan 
/ Vice President 
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Arthur H. Nielsen 
Gary A. Weston 
Cad Jay Peck 
Neil R. Sabln 
Harold C Verhaaren 
Mark H. Anderson* 
8. Kent Ludlow 
Richard M. Hymas 
JohtiK. Mangurn 
Rfchard K. Hincks 
Noel S.Hyde 
Robert P. Faust 
). Craig Smith* 
fay R. Mohknan 
David B. Hartvigsen** 
Mariiynn P. Flneshrtber 
Steven F. Alfred* 
Annette Sorensen 
Philip S. Lott 
NJELSEN 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza lc Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake CKy, Utah 64111 
Post Office Box 11806, Salt Lake CHy, Utah 84147 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 - Fax (801) 532-1913 
August 12, 1996 
" < * > J -OgdenOfRoe 
4699 Harrison Blvd. 
Suite 300 
Ogden. Utah 64403 
Telephone (601) 476-7501 
Fax (601) 476-7544 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (18&M925) 
OaJr M. Senior (1901-1965) 
Raymond T. Senior 0903-1995) 
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W A. Ranouiie0 
Ryan L. Richards, Esq. 
Associate General Counsel 
NOVELL, INC. 
1555 N. Technology Way, Bldg. A. 
Orem, Utah 84057-2399 
Re: BYU/SoftSolutions Dispute 
Dear Ryan: 
We understand that Novell recently withdrew approximately $1,000,000 from 
SoftSolutions Technology Coiporation's Account No. 42016683 at First Interstate Bank, leaving 
a balance of $20,000 in that account. This was done despite our requests to you that a portion 
of these funds be used to assist in settling the DSearch dispute with BYU. Prior to 
WordPerfect's acquisition of STC, this account was funded as a contingency account for exactly 
the type of situation that has arisen. 
Given the fact that the BYU award exceeds $1,700,000 (about 56% of which accrued 
after WordPerfect's acquisition of STC), it is apparent that the $20,000 remaining in this account 
and the balances, if any, in other STC accounts, are grossly inadequate. We firmly believe that 
it is in the best interests of Novell, STC, and SoftSolutions, Inc. to work together to settle this 
matter with BYU before public proceedings are initiated. Such proceedings will almost 
invariably include claims against STC (and thereby Novell) and will publicize the defective 
nature of the DSearch algorithm, thereby giving users of SoftSolutions substantial ammunition 
to use against STC in claims arising out of the DSearch-based problems they experienced. 
We are presently attempting to schedule a meeting with BYU for meaningful settlement 
discussions. We would appreciate hearing from you on whether or not Novell is inclined to be 
a part of these settlement efforts, and if so, in what manner. 
Ryan L. Richards, Esq. 
August 12, 1996 
Page -2-
Thank you again for your cooperation and assistance thus far. 
Sincerely, 
David B. Hartvigsen 
DBH.st 
cc: Kenneth Duncan 
Alvin Tedjamulia 
Lee Duncan 
